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This paper argues that it will become increasingly important to extend our
concept of user interfaces for individual users of computers to include
organizational interfaces for groups of users. A number of suggestions are given
for how to develop a theoretical base for designing such interfaces that includes
extensions of traditional cognitive and motivational points of view. For
instance, examples are used to illustrate how theories of multi-agent problem
solving and intrinsic motivation can contribute to the design of text-sharing
systems in organizations.
In an extended example, a model of flexibility and efficiency in alternative
organizational structures is summarized and used to: (1) explain historical
changes in American business structures, (2) predict how organizational
structures may change with the widespread use of computer systems, and (3)
suggest new ways computer systems can help coordinate the assignment of
tasks and the flow of information to people in organizations.
Studies of human-computer interaction have, in the past, focused primarily on designing user
interfaces to support individual problem solving. Much of the theoretical base for this work has
grown out of cognitive science theories concerning the information processing involved when
individual people solve problems, learn, and remember (e.g., see Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983; and
the other chapters in this volume).
In this chapter, I will suggest that it is becoming increasingly important to focus, not just on isolated
interactions between people and computers, but also on the interactions among groups of people that
are mediated by computers. To provide a theoretical base for this new endeavor, I will indicate how
traditional cognitive and motivational perspectives can be extended to include groups of people and
whole organizations. A critical component of this "organizational science" will be the analysis of the
information processing necessary to coordinate the activities of separate agents. The computer
systems that support group interactions will emphasize "organizational interfaces" as suggested by
the following definitions:
user interface - the parts of a computer program that connect a human user to the capabilities
provided by the computer;
organizational interface - the parts of a computer system that connect human users to each other
and to the capabilities provided by computers.
Thus an organizational interface includes one or more user interfaces. Thinking of the problem in
these new terms brings a number of additional factors into focus. For example, in designing
traditional programs for word processing, the user interface is designed to facilitate separate
problem-solving by isolated individuals. In designing programs for electronic mail, however, it is
important to design an organizational interface that facilitates cooperative problem solving by groups
of people. Even a very "easy to use" electronic mail system, for instance, that allows only explicitly
named individual addressees will be much less useful in a large organization than one that includes
centrally maintained distribution lists for identifying people who are interested in different topics.
Examples of organizational interfaces
In a sense, traditional data processing systems like accounting and order entry are examples of
systems in which the organizational interface is important. In all these cases, the system does not
simply support the work of single individuals but instead provides communication between people in
many different parts of the organization. Just as traditional user interfaces were often extremely
awkward and inflexible, however, the organizational interfaces embodied in traditional data
processing systems were also often very rigid and inconvenient.
Now that computer capabilities are dramatically increasing and computer costs are dramatically
decreasing, many new and much less routine kinds of organizational interfaces are becoming feasible,
and it is becoming increasingly important to make these interfaces more flexible and convenient. In
this section, I will briefly describe some examples of these new kinds of organizational interfaces. The
examples are organized in three loosely-defined categories: text sharing systems, project management
systems, and collaborative authoring systems.
Text sharing systems. One important class of systems in which organizational interfaces are critical
is what I will call "text sharing systems." This class includes (1) electronic mail systems for
transmitting messages to specific people (e.g., Uhlig, 1981), (2) computer conferencing systems in
which it is easy for people to create new topics and subtopics and to add and delete themselves from
topic interest lists (e.g., Hiltz & Turoff, 1978; see also Sarin & Grief, 1984), and (3) other structured
systems that use links to represent the relationship between nodes of text stored in a common
database (e.g., Trigg & Weiser, 1984; Lowe, 1984). For example, Lowe (1984) describes an
information retrieval system in which the argumentation structure of a debate is explicitly
3represented (see also Brown, 1983). An argument about the desirability of introducing a new product,
for instance, might include various claims, counter-claims, and pieces of evidence supporting
different courses of action. Readers viewing the database of argumentation could see claims and their
supporting evidence in order of importance (as determined by voting) or they could see various kinds
of summaries (e.g., just the claims, not the evidence).
Throughout this paper, I will use examples of text sharing s stems to illustrate general points.
An intelligent mail filter. One particular kind of text sharing system I will use as an example is an
"intelligent mail filter." It is a common experience in mature electronic mail communities for people
to either (1) be overwhelmed with electronic "junk mail," or (2) develop restrictive social norms about
where to send messages so that people sometimes fail to receive information they would have liked to
see (e.g., Brotz, 1981). To help solve this problem, we are now designing an intelligent mail filter that
will help people select the most useful pieces of electronic mail (or other semi-structured information)
from a large pool of less useful "junk mail" (see Malone et al, 1985; Brobst et al, 1985. For previous
discussion of the problem see, Wilson et al, 1984; Denning, 1982).
Previous approaches to this problem have been limited primarily to (1) centrally maintained
"distribution lists," (e.g., Brotz, 1981), (2) topic hierarchies in computer conferences (e.g., Hiltz &
Turoff, 1978), and (3) simple keywords for selecting messages (e.g., Stallman, 1983). In later sections
of this paper, I will suggest how concepts from artificial intelligence, economics, and organization
theory can be used to develop more sophisticated ways of filtering information in organizations.
Project management systems. Another category of system used for organizational coordination
includes project management systems. For instance, Sluizer and Cashman (1985) describe a
"coordinator tool" that keeps track of activities and responsibilities so it can answer questions like the
following:
On what tasks am I working now (in a specific role or in all my roles?)
What is Joe's long-term work load (in all his roles)?
Who is responsible for the next task in Project P?
4Other project management systems automatically assign tasks to people (e.g., Kedzierski, 1982),
construct schedules, and help allocate scarce resources such as people, machines, and money (e.g., Fox
et al, 1983).
Collaborative writing systems. A different kind of system supports collaborative writing by two or
more people (e.g. Goldstein & Bobrow, 980;: Enelbart, 1984). In the PIE system, for instance,
successive versions of a document are constructed from overLlays that contain each person's
modifications of previous versions (Goldstein & Bobrow, 1980). For example, one author might
construct a new version by accepting some of his collaborator's changes immediately, modifying
others, and rejecting some altogether.
WHAT KINDS OF THEORIES WILL HELP IN
DESIGNING ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACES?
In order to design these new organizational interfaces well, we need some (explicit or implicit)
theories about how computers can help organizations function. A natural place to look for such
theories is in the growing literature concerned with the relationship between organizations and
computers (e.g., see Keen & Scott Morton, 1978; Kling, 1980; Zuboff, 1982; Markus, 1983). This
literature has been concerned almost exclusively with two main themes: (1) the impacts of computers
on organizations, and (2) the implementation of computers in organizations. Unfortunately, neither
of these bodies of literature provides much direct guidance for designing systems. In a few cases, the
literature on impacts appears to recognize that the technology can have very different effects
depending on how it is used (e.g., Walton & Vittori, 1983; Mohrman & Lawler, 1984), but all too often
there seems to be an implicit assumption of technological determinism and an exclusive focus on
computer technology as it has been used, not as it might be used. The literature on implementation
of computers -pays somewhat more attention to different ways of using computer technology by
emphasizing, for example, the importance of "user involvement" in the selection and the design of
computer systems (e.g., Mumford and Henshall, 1979). Here, too, however, the most common
approach has been to take the technology as being mostly predetermined and to focus on what leads
people to use it. To caricature the two bodies of literature, the impacts literature has often seemed to
focus on "all the bad things that happen when you put in computers," and the implementation
literature has seemed to focus on "how to get people to use computers, no matter how bad they are."
In contrast to both of these approaches, I suggest that we need to pay much more attention to how to
design computer systems in the first place in such a way that they fit naturally into human
5organizations and have desirable impacts. In other words, I suggest that we need to focus much more
on developing design theories, not just explanatory or predictive theories (e.g., see Simon, 1981). In
addition to helping to design new computer systems, these theories may help design new
organizational structures and processes, too.
Unlike explanatory theories ("Y because X") and predictive theories ("If X, then Y"), design theories
emphasize how to achieve goals ("In order to achieve Y. do X."1 Thus design theories may include, for
example: () techniques for clarifying goals to be achieved by the systems (e.g., Sirbu, et al, 1984;
Rockart, 1979), (2) taxonomies of actions that might help achieve goals (e.g., Malone's (1982)
taxonomy of user interface features that enhance enjoyableness), and (3) guidelines for selecting
actions such as Norman's (1983) analysis of tradeoffs in user interface design and Malone and Smith's
(1984) analysis of tradeoffs in organizational design.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONS
There are a number of possible perspectives from which one can view organizations in order to
develop design-oriented theories. Four of these perspectives appear repeatedly in the literature on
organizations and computers (e.g., Kling, 1980; Keen & Scott Morton, 1978): economic (or "rational"),
structural (or process-oriented), human relations (or "quality of work life"), and political. In this
chapter, instead of adopting any of these perspectives directly, I will suggest the outlines of what
might be called a "cognitive science" or "organizational science" approach to many of the same issues.
Cognitive science and artificial intelligence appear to have made important progress in the last two
decades by identifying a level of analysis that is common to both human minds and computers: that is,
the information processing necessary to do things such as solve problems, learn, and remember (e.g.,
Norman, 1981).
I believe that similar progress is now possible by extending this approach to include the information
processing that occurs when groups of agents perform these same tasks. As mentioned above, a
critical component of this "organizational science" will be the analysis of the information processing
necessary to coordinate the activities of separate agents, whether these agents are people or computers
(see March & Simon, 1958; Malone, 1982; Malone & Smith, 1984). Just as cognitive science shows
the commonality in problems previously considered separately by disciplines such as psychology,
computer science, and linguistics, this new point of view unifies problems previously considered
separately in fields such as computer science, organization theory, and economics.
6Since this new "organizational science" emphasizes information processing, and since it is precisely
the dramatic changes in information processing technology that have led to our concern with
organizational interfaces in the first place, it seems quite likely that one of the most important
application areas for this new intellectual approach will be in the design of organizational interfaces.
As I will suggest below, however, the information processing perspective we will need in order to
properly understand how organizations function goes significantly beyond traditional cognitive
analyses. For instance, while previous cognitive theories have included goals as a component of
individual problem solving, in order to analyze organizational problem solving we will often need to
deal with conflicting goals held by different people.
There is another set of factors that, even though they are not easily analyzed in information
processing terms and are not changing dramatically, are still of great importance in designing
organizational interfaces. These are the factors that are emphasized in the human relations and
"quality of work life" perspectives. Since these factors are primarily concerned with why people are
motivated to pick the goals they do, I will call this second perspective "motivational". The remainder
of this section will be devoted to these two perspectives on organizations: information processing, and
motivational.
Before discussing the two perspectives, however, one further word of clarification is in order. It is,
unfortunately, all too common in the human sciences for people who find a particular perspective
useful for some purposes to secretly believe (and sometimes openly claim) that the perspective is
useful for all purposes. We might label this error the "nothing-but" fallacy, as in "people are nothing
but stimulus-response organisms" or "people are nothing-but information processors." Sometimes,
the "nothing but" error is incorrectly attributed to people who have not actually made it. For instance
it would be a mistake to assume that an airplane designer who modeled passengers as inert masses
believed that the passengers never moved or had no feelings. Similarly, it would also be a mistake to
assume that all information processing theorists believe people are "nothing-but" information
processors. n both cases, certain perspectives are useful for certain purposes, but not necessarily for
others. To help prevent both forms of error here, I have explicitly included two widely used, but
complementary perspectives on organizations.
7Information processing perspective
This perspective emphasizes the kinds of information used in an organization and how the
information is communicated and processed. This point of view can be used to analyze many of the
issues emphasized by the "structural" (e.g., Galbraith, 1973), economic (e.g., Hurwicz, 1973), political
(e.g., Cyert & March, 1963), and "organizational communications" (e.g., Rice, 1980) perspectives. To
illustrate this approach, I will discuss some implications of research on multi-agent problem solving
for designing organizational interfaces.
The topic of problem-solving has a long-standing and important place in the field of cognitive science
(e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972; Newell, 1980), but with few exceptions (e.g., Smith & Davis, 1981;
Kornfeld & Hewitt, 1981; Corkill & Lesser, 1983) this work has only analyzed the problem-solving
behavior of individual problem-solvers. In order to extend this work to include multiple agent
problem solving, we must begin to clarify what aspects of problem solving emerge only with multiple
agents.
Newell (1979) summarizes the components of individual problem solving behavior in the following
categories: (1) the goals the problem solver tries to achieve, (2) the state-space or set of possibilities
that may be explored, (3) the operators or actions that the problem solver may take, (4) the constraints
that must be satisfied by solutions, and (5) the search control knowledge that guides the problem
solver in searching for solutions.
When multiple agents are involved in the problem solving (e.g., see Smith and Davis, 1981; Corkill &
Lesser, 1983) at least two additional components emerge as being important: (6) task assignment or
the ways subtasks are assigned to agents, and (7) inter-agent communication.1 In the extended
example at the end of this chapter, we will examine the process of task assignment in greater detail.
In this section, I will discuss issues related to filtering inter-agent communication and dealing with
goal conflicts between agents.
Filtering inter-agent communication
One of the problems that emerges with multiple agent problem solving is how to control the explosion
of messages that may arise when each agent broadcasts all results to all other agents (e.g., Kornfeld,
1982). The beginnings of a solution to this problem are suggested by the Hearsay II problem solving
architecture (Erman et al, 1980). This architecture contains a number of separate modules called
"knowledge sources" (KS's) that communicate with each other through a global data structure called
a "blackboard." Different KS's check the blackboard for situations to which they know how to
respond and then post the results of their computations back on the blackboard for other KS's to use.
8To prevent all KS's from having to scan the entire blackboard, the Hearsay II blackboard was
carefully structured so that different regions corresponded to different parts of the problem being
solved.
We can think of text sharing systems in human organizations as a similar kind of "electronic
blackboard." For the problem domain of the original H[earsa system (speech recognition), a fairly
simple two-dimensional structure was used for the blackboard (time vs. level of interpretation). For
more complex problems in human organizations, we can use much more sophisticated structuring
techniques such as semantic networks and frame inheritance networks (e.g., Brachman & Schmolze,
in press).
For example, the users of our intelligent mail filtering system (Malone et al, 1985) can conveniently
compose messages using a network of different templates for different types of information (e.g.,
meeting announcements, bug reports). A meeting announcement template, for instance, has fields
for "time," "place," "organizer," and "topic." Its subtype, seminar announcement, adds a field for
"speaker." Then receivers of messages will be able to construct much more sophisticated filters than
would be possible with simple keyword searches (e.g., "show me all the announcements for seminars
at MIT organized by people in my department except for seminars which occur on Tuesdays").
Different groups can develop detailed structures to represent the information of specific concern to
them. For example, a product design team might have an elaborate network of message types
describing different aspects of the product (e.g., market size estimates, response time specifications,
alternative power supply vendors). Then, for instance, marketing specialists who believe that the
critical factors determining potential market size for the product are cost and response time, can
devote most of their attention to the regions of the blackboard in which people discuss those two
factors and ignore all the rest of the technical specifications for the product.
Goal conflicts
Even though many organizational and economic models assume, for purposes of simplicity, that all
members of an organization have the same goals, it is a fact of daily organizational life that conflicts
of interest between people are frequent and often of great importance to how well an organization
functions (e.g., see March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963). Designers of organizational
interfaces ignore this fact at their peril. Two ways that organizational interfaces can explicitly take
goal conflicts into account involve: coalition formation, and confidentiality.
9Coalition formation. Information technology can clearly affect the formation of coalitions in
organizations. For example, IBM's "Gripe Net" (Emmett, 1981) was an electronic mail system that
allowed a group of geographically separated programmers who felt that their software product was
being given too little attention in the company's product line to develop a slightly mutinous sense of
camaraderie and power.
Whether this particular coalition was good or bad for IBM, many observers of organizational behavior
feel that the healthy formation of competing coalitions is an essential part of the functioning of
organizations (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Mintzberg, 1983). Lowe's (1984) system for computer-
mediated debate that was described above illustrates how a text sharing system might facilitate this
process. In his system different people enter arguments, counter-arguments, and evidence into a
highly structured textual data base in such a way that constructive debate is facilitated and
newcomers are able to quickly see the most important opposing points of view. Our perspective here
suggests that a system like this might be even more useful in facilitating coalition formation if it
includes the names (and electronic addresses) of the people who wrote and supported the views
represented.
Confidentiality. There are already a number of techniques for specifying and enforcing various kinds
of access controls in computer systems (e.g., Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975; Fernandez, Summers, &
Wood, 1981). The complexities of confidentiality in real organizations go far beyond the simple
mechanisms proposed so far, however. Imagine, for instance, trying to decide whether to tell someone
else in a company you work for about a serious problem in a product you are developing. You might
consider factors like whether revealing the problem would hurt your reputation, how likely it is that
the person could help you solve the problem, and what the consequences would be if you don't tell the
person now and he finds out later. Though many of these factors would be quite difficult to represent,
the more of them that can be automatically included in text sharing systems, the more useful the
systems are likely to be.
Motivational perspective
The information processing perspective in the previous section captures many important aspects of
coordinating the activities of people in organizations but it leaves out some of the most important
factors about why people are there in the first place, how hard they work, and whether they find their
activities satisfying or alienating (e.g., March & Simon, 1958). This perspective is central to work in
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the "quality of work life" and "human relations" traditions (e.g., McGregor, 1960; Roethlisberger &
Dickson, 1939; Likert, 1961; Argyris, 1973; Herzberg, 1968).
Table 1 shows a number of factors that affect motivation and satisfaction at work (adapted from
Malone & Lepper, in press; and Hackman & Oldham, 1980). Some factors, such as pay, benefits, and
working conditions, are primarily extrinsic to the tasks- beiing' performed. Hertzberg ( 1968)
hypothesizes that these "hygiene" factor s may le ad to dissatisfatction if they are below some
accepTable level, but that they are not positive "motivators" for greater effort. In other words, these
extrinsic factors may affect which goals people choose and whether they choose to participate in the
organization at all (e.g., see March & Simon, 1958, ch. 4), but these factors alone would not usually
lead to highly involving and satisfying jobs.
Another set of factors, however, are intrinsic to the tasks being performed and they seem to be
particularly important in determining the degree of involvement and satisfaction in an activity (e.g.,
see Hertzberg, 1968). These factors are divided into two groups: (1) individual motivations that may
be present in any activity, and (2) interpersonal motivations that depend for their appeal on
interactions between people.
Individual motivations. Malone (1982) discusses a number of suggestions for how individual
motivational factors such as challenge, fantasy, and curiosity can be used to make user interfaces
more interesting and enjoyable. For example, challenge can be enhanced by incorporating successive
layers of complexity in an interface with each layer being mastered in turn as users become more
skilled. When we expand our focus to include designing organizational interfaces, it becomes clear
that computers make it possible and sometimes desirable to redesign whole jobs and organizations, as
well as individual programs. For example, Hackman and Oldham's (1980) concept of "skill variety"
in well-designed jobs can be seen as another way of increasing the challenge of a job.
There are two differences between the list of individual motivations presented here and that used by
Malone (1982). First, the category of "fantasy" was renamed (somewhat less evocatively) "task
meaningfulness" in order to capture more directly Hackman and Oldham's notion that jobs are more
satisfying when they involve the completion of a "whole" and indentifiable piece of work ("task
identity") that has a substantial impact on the lives of other people ("task significance"). In computer
games and in some unavoidably dull jobs, it is possible to increase the meaningfulness of an activity
by using fantasy (e.g., the task of controlling a factory process can be mapped into a fantasy display of
piloting a space ship [Carroll & Thomas, 19801). However, the implication of this new category name
is that organizational interfaces should be designed to make the tasks themselves as meaningful as
1 1
possible. For example, one of the reported benefits of an early office automation project was that bank
clerks had their jobs restructured so that they no longer performed isolated clerical steps in a process
they did not understand but instead handled all the steps in dealing with their assigned customers
(Matteis, 1979; Lorsch, Gibson, & Seeger, 1975).
The second change is that HIackman and Oldham's cateoory of' autonomv" was added to Malone's
(1982) list. The word "autonomy" was used here instead of "control" (as used by Malone and Lepper)
to capture the sense that the freedom people have to determine how they work (and sometimes what
work they do) is an important motivating factor even when they don't "control" anything else.
Interpersonal motivations. When we are concerned with group interactions, three kinds of
interpersonal motivations (cooperation, competition, and recognition) can be as important as
individual motivations (see Malone and Lepper, in press). Organizational interfaces can be designed
to engage these interpersonal motivations. For example, one of the problems that may arise in text
sharing systems like those we have been discussing is how to motivate people to contribute
information. In addition to the pricing schemes discussed in the example below, intrinsic motivations
may be used for this purpose. For example, people's motivations for recognition by their peers might
be engaged by a system in which rankings of the most widely read messages in different categories
can be displayed along with their authors' names. This approach should be even more effective if
messages that are rated by some readers as being very valuable are then automatically redistributed
to a wider audience.
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EXAMPLE: FLEXIBILITY AND EFFICIENCY IN
ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
So far in this chapter, we have discussed in general terms how an "organizational science" might be
developed and how it could be applied to designing organizational interfaces. In the remainder of the
chapter, I will make a small part of these ideas more concrete by summarizing a specific model of
organizational coordination that is presented in detail elsewhere (Malone & Smith, 1984:; Malone,
1985). I will show how the model can be used to help explain historical changes in American business
structures and to suggest how to design new organizations that take advantage of the radically
changing costs and capabilities of computer technology. To analyze different organizational
structures, the model focuses explicitly on how tasks are assigned to people (or machines). This task
assignment is, of course, only one of the important processes that occur in organizations, but as the
applications below illustrate, the qualitative results based on this analysis appear to be widely
applicable. In this sense, our models are similar in spirit to many mathematical models in which
extremely simplified (and sometimes implausible) assumptions lead to powerful insights and
qualitatively correct results.
To begin with, we can think of any organization as having (1) a set of goals to be achieved and (2) a set
of processors that can perform the tasks (i.e., achieve the subgoals) necessary to reach these overall
goals. For example, an automobile manufacturing company like General Motors can be thought of as
having a set of goals (e.g., producing several different lines of automobiles--Chevrolet, Pontiac,
Cadillac, etc.) and a set of processors to achieve those goals (e.g., the people and machines specialized
for doing marketing, manufacturing, engineering, etc.) We will be concerned here with the answers
to two basic questions about how these goals and processors are organized:
(1) Are the processors shared among goals or dedicated to single goals?
(2) Is the decision-making about which processors perform which tasks, centralized or
decentralized?
There are four possible combinations of answers to these two questions, and Figure 1 shows the
organizational structures that result from each combination. The structures are labelled with the
terms used for describing human organizations, but analogous structures exist in computer systems
as well. These generic organizational structures serve as the building blocks for much more complex
organizations.
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We will compare the different organizational forms in terms of their production costs, their
coordination costs and their vulnerability costs. The assumptions we describe in this section and the
appendix will allow us to measure these factors in the following terms: (1) production costs in terms
of the delay in processing tasks, (2) coordination costs in terms of the minimum number of
communication instances, or "messages," necessary to assign tasks to processors, and (3)
vulnerability costs in terms of the costs of unexpected chano'es such as component failures.
Product hierarchy
When processors are not shared among products and decision making is decentralized the resulting
organizational structure is a product hierarchy. In this structure there is a separate division for each
product or major product line. (Sometimes the division is made along other "mission-oriented" lines
such as geographical regions or market segments.). Each division has a "product manager" and its
own separate departments for different functions such as marketing, manufacturing, and
engineering. General Motors was one of the first major American corporations to adopt this form
when it was reorganized from a structure with large centralized functional departments to one with
separate divisions for Chevrolet, Pontiac, Cadillac, and other product lines. (see Chandler, 1962).
In this form, the "executive office" may set long-range strategic directions, but it is not ordinarily
involved in the operational coordination of tasks and processors. The lack of connection with the
executive office for scheduling purposes is indicated by dotted lines in Figure 1.
The solution to the task assignment problem that is implied by this form is simple: Whenever a task
of a certain type needs to be done, the product manager assigns the task to the department that
specializes in that type of task. In the "pure" form of a product hierarchy, there is only one
department (or one processor) for each type of task, so the assignment decision is trivial.
When processors are not shared among products, but decision-making about task assignment is
centralized, the second structure shown in Figure 1 results. The fact that the executive office
performs all the operational coordination of tasks in all the divisions is indicated by the solid lines
connecting the executive office to the divisions. This structure, which might be called an
"overcentralized product hierarchy" is not labeled in the figure since it is inferior to the simple
product hierarchy in terms of the factors we are considering. It requires more coordination than the
simple product hierarchy (since there is an extra layer of management involved in all decisions) but it
has no greater efficiency or flexibility than the simple product hierarchy.
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Functional hierarchy
In a functional hierarchy, as shown at the bottom of Figure 1, processors of a similar type are pooled
in functional departments and shared among products. This sharing reduces duplication of effort and
allows processing loads to be balanced over all products. For example, having a single engineering
department in a company instead of separate engineering departments in each division may reduce
the need to duplicate expensive facilities and may allow a few people with specialized expertise to he
shared among all p0roducts instead of having to hire separate specialists for each division. In an even
simpler example, a company may need less manufacturing capacity if, instead of having to provide
enough capacity in each division to meet peak demands, it can balance heavy demands for one
product against ordinary demands for other products that share the same manufacturing facility.
In a purely functional hierarchy, the "executive office" must coordinate the operational processing for
all products. The task assignment method implied by the "pure" form of this organizational structure
is somewhat more complicated than for the product hierarchy, because an extra layer of management
is involved: Whenever a task of a certain type needs to be done, the executive office delegates it to the
functional manager of the appropriate type who, in turn, assigns it to one of the processors in that
department. In order to make this assignment intelligently, the functional manager needs to keep
track of not only the priorities of the tasks, but also the loads and capabilities of the processors in the
department.
Decentralized market
So far we have considered two hierarchical structures for coordinating task assignments. One of the
important insights from the literature of organizational theory and economics (e.g., see Williamson,
1975) is that the same tasks can, in principle, be coordinated by either a market or a hierarchy. For
example, General Motors does not need to make all the components that go into its finished products.
Instead of manufacturing its own tires, for instance, it can purchase tires from other suppliers. When
it does this, it is using a market to coordinate the same activities (i.e. tire production) that would
otherwise have been coordinated by hierarchical management structures within General Motors.
We distinguish here between two kinds of markets: decentralized and centralized. In a decentralized
market, processors are shared among goals, but the decision-making about task assignment is
decentralized. In the pure form, this means that all buyers are in contact with all possible sellers and
they each make their own decisions about which transactions to accept. For instance, the real estate
and apartment markets in many areas are examples of decentralized markets where buyers must
communicate with many different possible sellers to find the product they select. We model this
process as one in which buyers send some form of "request for bids" to sellers of the appropriate type
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and then select a seller from among the bids received. In this framework, advertising can be
considered a special kind of implicitly requested "bid." In either case, a large number of "messages"
must be exchanged in a decentralized market in order for buyers and sellers to select each other.
Centralized market
[n a centralized inarket. buyers do not need to contact all possible sellers because a broker is alreadyc
in contact with the possible sellers. This centralization of decision-nlmakin means that substantially
fewer messages need to be exchanged compared to a decentralized market. For example, the stock
market is a relatively centralized market. People who want to buy a particular stock do not need to
contact all the people who own that stock, they only need to contact a broker who is also in contact
with people who want to sell the stock.
From a task assignment point of view, a centralized market is identical to a functional hierarchy.
Both have a single central scheduler for each type of task, both require the same number of messages
for assignment, both have the same amount of load sharing among processors, and both have the
same responses to component failures. Thus one of the insights provided by this analysis is that these
two forms, which would often be considered very different, are identical in terms of the information
processing variables we are considering here.
Other organizational forms
As mentioned above, these four "pure" organizational forms serve as building blocks for the much
more complex organizations we observe. For example a "matrix" organization is a hybrid form in
which a functional hierarchy is augmented by separate product managers for each product who have
direct links to specialized processors in each functional division.
Tradeoffs among organizational structures
Now that we have distinguished among these generic organizational forms, one of the most important
questions we can ask is what are the relative advantages of each. In particular, we are concerned
with the tradeoffs between efficiency and flexibility in the different structures.
Efficiency. We will view efficiency as being composed of two elements production costs and
coordination costs. Production costs are the costs of performing the basic tasks necessary to achieve
the organization's goals--for example the basic manufacturing, marketing, and engineering tasks
necessary to produce automobiles. Coordination costs include all the "overhead" associated with
deciding which tasks will be performed by which processors. In hierarchies, much of what managers
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do can be considered "coordination costs." In markets, the equivalent coordination costs include costs
for the seller (e.g., advertising and sales) and the "search costs" for the buyer (e.g., the costs of talking
to many different salespeople.)
Flexibility. In addition to being part of efficiency, coordination costs are also a component of
flexibility, since the amount of re-coordination necessar to adapt to new situations helps determine
how flexible a structure is. The other component of flexibilitly we will consider is L!ulnerabilitv costs,
or the unavoidable costs of a changed situation that are incurred before the organization can adapt to
the new situation. For example, when one of a company's major suppliers goes out of business, the
company may have a number of costs associated with finding a new supplier, renegotiating a
contract, and so forth. These costs are vulnerability costs.
Comparisons. As shown in Table 2, it is now possible to compare the different organizational
structures on the dimensions of production costs, coordination costs, and vulnerability costs. All the
evaluation criteria shown in the chart are represented as costs, so in every column low is "good" and
high is "bad".
Some of the comparisons in the table can be justified on the basis of previous generalizations about
organizational design (e.g. Galbraith, 1973; March and Simon 1958; Gulick & Urwick, 1937). A
formal approach by Malone and Smith (1984; Malone, 1985) shows how all the inequalities shown in
the table can be derived mathematically from a fairly straightforward set of assumptions using
queueing theory and probability theory. The Appendix of this paper summarizes these assumptions
and gives intuitive explanations of the reasoning in the mathematical proofs.
Organizational science applications of the model
Even though we have illustrated this analysis of organizational structures with examples from
human organizations, it can be applied to organizations of computer processors as well. This section
summarizes one application of the model to computer systems and one to human organizations.
Decentralized scheduling for computer networks
There are several examples of computer systems organized as decentralized markets (Malone, Fikes,
and Howard, 1983; Smith and Davis, 1981; Farber and Larson, 1972). For example, the Enterprise
system (Malone, Fikes, and Howard, 1983) is a decentralized scheduler that allows personal
computers connected by a network to share tasks in a way that assigns tasks to the "best" available
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processor at any time. Processors with tasks to be done are clients and other unused processors on the
networks are contractors. Clients send out "requests for bids " for tasks to be done and potential
contractors respond with "bids" indicating their availability or cost for performing the tasks. The
clients then select a bidder and send the task to the winning bidder.
it is easy to imagine an alternative implementation of this svstemrn as a centralized market with one
processor on the network serving a single centralized broker. Instead of broadcasting
announcements of tasks to be done to all available contractors, client machines would simply send
their requests to the scheduling node. The scheduling node would keep track of the availability of all
the processors on the network and send the task to the best processor when it became available.
We are now in a position to evaluate some of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the
centralized and decentralized systems.
As shown in Table 2, the primary advantage of the decentralized system is its high reliability (low
vulnerability costs), and its primary disadvantage is the number of messages that must be
transmitted back and forth to construct schedules (high coordination costs). Which of these factors is
most important in a given situation depends on the system load, the cost of sending bidding messages,
the reliability of the machines involved, and the costs of scheduler failure.
In particular, Malone and Smith (1984) derive exact comparisons between the two systems, based on
the formulas used in the proofs of the inequalities. Then using rough estimates of the parameters for
the environment in which the prototype Enterprise system was implemented, they show that the
decentralized market appears to have a slight advantage over the centralized market in this
environment. The direction of this result was, in fact, counter-intuitive for the developers of the
system.
Historical changes in American business structures.
Figure 2 summarizes, in simplified form, the changes in the dominant organizational structures used
by American businesses as described by Chandler (1962, 1977) and other business historians. From
about 1850 to 1910, numerous small businesses coordinated by decentralized markets began to be
superseded by large scale functionally organized hierarchies. These hierarchies continued to grow in
size until, in the early and middle parts of this century, they were in turn replaced by the multi-
divisional product hierarchies that are prevalent today.
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Malone and Smith (1984) show how these changes can be explained in terms of the factors we have
been considering. The first change, from decentralized markets to functional hierarchies, can be
explained by noting that as decentralized markets grow larger, their coordination costs increase
much more rapidly than the coordination costs for the equivalent functional hierarchies. 2 Thus,
there will be situations where markets are preferred to functional hierarchies at one size, but where
markets become less and less desirable as they grow. There is a pr-essure, then, for more and more of
the activity that is coordinated 1)v markets to be transferred into functional hierarchies in order to
economize on coordination costs.
The second change, from functional hierarchies to product hierarchies, can be explained by observing
how the relative importance of production costs and coordination costs was changing in the early part
of this century. As Table 2 shows, product hierarchies have lower coordination costs--but higher
production costs--than functional hierarchies. During the period in question (roughly 1920 to 1960),
production processes became more and more efficient and constituted a smaller and smaller
proportion of the total cost of products (e.g. see Jonscher, 1983). Meanwhile, there were fewer
improvements in the efficiency of coordination processes so coordination costs constituted an
increasing proportion of the total costs of products. Thus product hierarchies, which economized on
coordination costs instead of production costs, became increasingly attractive.
Implications for designing organizational interfaces
This model gives us a systematic way of thinking about organizational coordination that can be
useful in several ways in designing organizational interfaces. First, it helps predict what kinds of
organizational structures will become more desirable with the widespread use of information
technology. Second, it suggests specific ways of designing computer-based task assignment systems
that support these new structures.
Effect of widespread use of computers on organizational structure
In order to begin, we need to make some assumptions about which of the parameters in our model is
directly affected by information technology. It seems plausible to hypothesize that the widespread
use of computers in organizations may substantially decrease the "unit costs" of coordination--both
the transmission and processing of information. This assumption is of course, an empirically testable
hypothesis, and there is at least some suggestive data that support it (e.g., Crawford, 1982). If
coordination costs decrease, then coordination costs that would previously have been prohibitively
high will, in some situations, become affordable.
___I______·I______1___11·___114__1_ 
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According to our model, this could have at least two possible effects for companies presently organized
as product hierarchies (see Table 2). In some industries or firms, economizing on production costs is
the most important strategic consideration. In these cases, our model suggests that product
hierarchies should shift toward functional hierarchies in order to take advantage of the lower
production costs in functional hierarchies. For example, some uses of computers (e.g., traditional
m"anagement inlornaltion s stens") might allow a greater efficiency and centralization of decision-
makitn b mkntliog it easier for top managers in large functional hierarchies to monitor and control
their organizations Galbraith, 1973; Walton & Vittori, 1983: Kling, 1980).
For many industries and companies, however, we believe that retaining maximum flexibility may be
an even more important strategic consideration (e.g., see Piore & Sabel, 1984; Huber 1984). Our
model suggests that these companies should shift toward being more like decentralized markets. The
higher coordination requirements of these market-like structures will now be more affordable, and
markets provide the additional flexibility of being less vulnerable to sudden situational changes.
For example, information technology can lower the costs of market-like transactions with
innovations such as remote order entry terminals on customer premises, "electronic yellow pages,"
and on-line credit networks (see Ives & Learmonth, 1984, for examples of these and a number of
related innovations already in use). Lowering these costs makes it easier for companies to use market
mechanisms for rapidly adjusting to changes in supplies and demands.
There are two ways market-like structures can be used for coordination. One way is with actual
buying and selling between different companies. To make greater use of this mechanism for
increasing flexibility our economy will increasingly use products from numerous small firms whose
activities are coordinated by decentralized markets rather than products from a few large
hierarchies. The increasing importance of small entrepeneurial companies in many rapidly changing
high technology markets--particularly in the computers industry--provides an early indication of this
trend (e.g., Rogers & Larsen, 1984).
Another, and perhaps more likely, possibility is that coordination mechanisms like those in a market
will come to be used more and more inside large firms. For example, the widespread use of elecronic
mail, computer conferencing, and electronic markets (see below) can facilitate what some observers
(e.g., Mintzberg, 1979; Toffler, 1970) have called "adhocracies," that is, rapidly changing
organizations with many shifting project teams composed of people with different skills and
knowledge. These organizations will rely heavily on networks of lateral relations at all levels of the
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organization rather than solely on the one-to-many hierarchical relations of traditional
bureaucracies (e.g., Rogers, 1984; Naisbitt, 1983).
Computer-based internal markets
Our model also suggests that any computer-aided task assignment system (e.g., Sluizer & Cashman,
1985: Kedzierski, 1982) should include, not only clescriptions ,t' the tasks to be done and the
capabilities of different people. but also indications of the relative importance of different tasks. A
market is a special kind of task assignment system in which importance is measured in money. It is
easy to imagine similar kinds of project management systems that use a form of bidding with non-
monetary "priority points" for task scheduling. To illustrate the point, I will briefly describe a
decentralized task assignment system that is exactly analogous to the system of priority points used
for scheduling computer jobs by Malone, Fikes, and Howard (1983).
In most projects there are tasks that can, in principle, be done by any of a number of project team
members. The project manager does not always know enough about the skills, preferences, and
availability of team members to do a good job of assigning these tasks to people. This is especially
true when team members are working on several projects simultaneously. In these cases, a market-
like task assignment system can be of great value. Project managers can describe tasks and indicate
their importance using priority points from a fixed budget of points they receive for the project. Then
team members who are capable of doing the task can compare the importance of the task to their
other tasks and decide whether they want to do the task and when they could complete it. Each team
member who is interested submits a "bid" specifying an estimated completion time. The lowest
bidder gets to do the job and accumulates the priority points associated with it. If no team member
submits a satisfactory bid, the project manager may have to raise the priority points associated with
the task. If team members finish a job substantially later than the completion time in their bid, they
are penalized by losing priority points. The priority points accumulated by each team member can
then be used in determining salaries, bonuses, or other forms of compensation.
A more elaborate version of this idea is suggested by the computer-mediated internal markets
proposed by Turoff (1984). This system could help coordinate a range of activities from matching
people and tasks to controlling information flows in a text-sharing system. The basic premise is that
there is an internal "free market" for information and services within an organization. Employees
with desirable skills, for instance, can "contract out" some of their time to high bidders anywhere in
the organization. In an extreme form of this system motivated and talented workers can "become
their own boss" by fully paying off their own salary and devoting full time to being an information
provider.
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The market mechanism can also be used to help prevent unwanted information flows. For instance,
the senders of unsolicited messages can be charged in proportion to the value of the time people will
spend reading the messages, that is, more for long messages, more for messages sent to many people,
and more for messages to highly paid recipients. In an even more extreme use of this idea, people who
receive undesirable "junk maill" can indicate that fact and the sendetr will then be penalized by an
additional surcharo'e see Br1obst. et al. or an extended (liscussion).
CONCLUSION
Studies of people and computers have, in the past, fallen largely into two groups. On the one hand,
there have been micro-level studies in the tradition of human factors and experimental psychology
which have focused on how to design individual user interfaces that were easy for people to learn and
use. On the other hand, there have been macro-level studies in the traditions of organization theory,
economics, and other disciplines that have largely taken computer technology as predetermined and
focused on what effects it had or how to get people to use it.
In this paper, I have tried to show how these two perspectives can be combined. I believe that we need
to extend traditional cognitive points of view to include information-processing and motivation of
multiple agents in organizations. At the same time, we need to develop theoretical perspectives that
do not view computer technology as a "black box" but instead have positive implications for designing
computer systems that fit naturally into human organizations.
By extending the cognitive perspective to include, not just individual information processing, but also
organizational information processing, this approach has several potential benefits for cognitive
science. First, it seems likely that the transfer of insights back and forth between disciplines in this
organizational science will be useful here as it has been in other cognitive science endeavors. As
computer system design comes to rely more and more on parallel processing architectures, lessons
from human organizations, like the analysis of decentralized scheduling mechanisms described
above, should become much more valuable. Even more intriguing for cognitive psychologists is the
prospect of using lessons from human organizations and computer systems to develop better theories
of how different processes within human brains are coordinated (e.g., Minsky, in preparation;
Barnard, this volume). Finally, as Carroll remarks in the introduction to this volume, confronting
the realities of designing computer systems that will be genuinely useful in human organizations
provides a sobering test for the scope of our theories.
_11_1·____ __________
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Appendix
Justifications for Organizational Form Comparisons
In this appendix, we give intuitive justifications of the qualitative comparisons in Table 2. Formal
proofs are included in Malone & Smith 1984) and Malone (1985).
Table 3 summarizes the assumptions made about different organizational structures. in addition, the
following assumptions are made:
(1) Production costs are proportional to the average delay in processing tasks.
(2) Tasks are randomly generated.
(3) Processing each task takes a random amount of time.
(4) Coordination costs are proportional to the number of messages sent between agents to assign
tasks.
(5) Vulnerability costs are proportional to the expected costs due to failures of processors or
managers.
(6) Both processors and scheduling managers sometimes fail (i.e., with probabilities greater than
0).
(7) The cost of delaying a job in order to reassign it is less than the cost of disrupting an entire
division or organization.
(8) The cost of disrupting an entire organization is greater than the cost of disrupting a division.
Production costs
The product hierarchy has the highest average delay in processing tasks because it uses slow
processors that are not shared. The decentralized market, centralized market, and functional
hierarchy all have a somewhat lower average delay time because they are able to take advantage of
the "load leveling" that occurs when tasks are shared among a number of similar processors. For
example, processors that would otherwise be idle can take on "overflow" tasks from busy processors
thus reducing the overall average delay.
Coordination costs
The product hierarchy requires the least number of messages for task assignment since each task is
simply sent to the processor of the appropriate type in the division in which the task originates. The
centralized market and functional hierarchy require more scheduling messages since tasks must be
sent to a centralized scheduling manager (e.g., a functional manager or a broker) before being sent to
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the proper processor. The decentralized market requires the most messages of all since assigning
each task requires sending "requests for bids" to a number of possible processors of the appropriate
type and then receiving bids in return.
Vulnerability Costs
I'he decentralized mnarlet is the least vulnerable to component filure since if one processor fails, the
task is nlv delaVed until it can be transferred to another processor. he centralized market and
functional hierarchy are somewhat more vulnerable since not only can tasks be delayed by the failure
of individual processors, but also the entire system will fail if the centralized scheduling manager
fails. The product hierarchy is also more vulnerable than the decentralized market because when a
processor fails, tasks cannot be easily transferred to another similar processor.
24
Footnotes
I X number of other factors such as goal genelration. problemn decompol.sit i()n task pirioritization, and
result snthesis are a1ll imporitant in multi-agent problem solvin, hut they alre p resent in single
agent problem solving as well.
2 The complete models used in Malone & Smith's explanations include two additional factors that
were omitted here: (1) economies of scale when large scale processors are used instead of several
small ones, and (2) the effects of increasing the size of the economy as a whole.
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TIable 
,Motivational Factors in Organizations
1. Extrinsic motivations
Pay, benefits, etc.
II. Intrinsic motivations
A. Individual
1. Challenge
2. Curiousity
3. Task meaningfulness
4. Autonomy
B. Interpersonal
1. Cooperation
2. Competition
3. Recognition
~~_1 __1_____~~~~~___ ·__ __^II_~~~~~ ~~ a ~  ·_ ________~~~~~~·I___ ___----- -- 
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Table 2
Tradeoffs Among Alternative Organizational Forms
Organizational
Form
Evaluation Criteria
Efficiency
Production Costs
(Average delay)
Coordination
Costs
(Message
processing costs)
Vulnerability
Costs
(Average cost of
component
failure)
Product hierarchy
Decentralized
market
Centralized
market/
Fu nctional
hierarchy
H
M
M
Note: L = Low costs ("good")
M = Medium costs
H = High costs("bad")
Flexibility
L M
H L
M
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Table 3
Assumptions about Alternative Organizational Forms
Organizational
Form
Production Costs Coordination Costs Vulnerability Costs
CentralizationProcessor
Scale of decision.
making
Minimum
number of
messages to
assign task to
best processor
Product hierarchy
Decentralized
market
No
Yes
Small
Small
No
No
2
2m + 2
division
disrupted
task
reassigned
Centralized
market/
Functional
hierarchy
Yes Small Yes 4 taskreassigned
Entire
organization
disrupted
Note: m is the number of processors in the market.
Processors
shared
among
products
Result of
processor
failure
Result of
scheduler
failure
 
___l____sl___U___11^111111_·1_1___1__
PROCESSORS
SHARED
AMONG
GOALS
NO
CENTRALIZATION
OF
DECISION-MAKING
NO rfdAL
Product
hierarchy
Decentralized
market
Centralized
market
Q ManogersE) Clients
C Different1 process or
types
Functional
hierarchy
Figure 1
Alternative Organizational Fonms
_~ 
.
_ 
_ 
_ 
.
.
.-
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NO YES
YES NO
YES YES
Key:
0
Fl
dd
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